Golden Frog is honored to be among the nearly 150 signatories of a letter sent to President Obama this morning condemning the idea mandatory backdoors! encrypted products and services.
the fight to protect the encryption is essential for the future of the Internet. Encryption is how people anxious to protect their privacy and Internet communications private information hackers and the government and the intrusion of the company. US companies encrypt confidential and proprietary information such as trade secrets and customer data.
Encryption is not an obstacle to national security. Golden Frog and others in the tech community who care about online privacy by not anti-law enforcement. We are not interested in jeopardizing national security. We believe in protecting the customers who rely on us for their Internet connection, ensuring that the data they send and receive is encrypted and protected from prying eyes. This data belongs to them; it is their property. It is not for us, an Internet service provider, or the government.
hardened building encryption services is difficult enough without the FBI or NSA asking the community technology intentionally weakened their infrastructure via backdoors. The government did not need a backdoor or gold key to decrypt it. If you want the data, do not ask for a back door. Instead, get a warrant and go through the door.
We hope that President Obama and others in the federal government are starting to realize encryption libraries and other basic security are "critical infrastructure" that require the private sector and the government to invest and work together. Encryption is everyone's tool for protection.
We ask that the focus of the White House on the development of policies that promote, rather than undermine, the wide adoption of strong encryption technology. These policies will in turn help promote and protect cybersecurity, economic growth, and human rights, both here and abroad.
The full letter is available here. It was led by Kevin Bankston of the Open Technology Institute, and is also included below.
President Barack Obama
The White House
10 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20500
Mr. President Obama,
We the undersigned represent a broad range of civil society organizations dedicated to protecting civil liberties, human rights, and online innovation, and technology companies, professional associations and experts and security policy. We are writing today to respond to recent statements by administration officials regarding the deployment of strong encryption technology in the devices and services offered by the US technology sector. These officials have suggested that US companies should avoid providing products that are secured by encryption, unless those companies also weaken their security in order to maintain the ability to decrypt the data of their customers to the government's request. Some officials have even suggested that Congress should take action to ban these products or mandate of such capabilities.
We urge you to reject any proposal that US companies deliberately weaken the security of their products. We ask that the White House instead focus on the development of policies that support rather than undermine the broad adoption of strong encryption technology. These policies will in turn help promote and protect cybersecurity, economic growth, and human rights, both here and abroad.
Strong encryption is the cornerstone of security in the economy of modern information. Encryption protects billions of people every day against countless threats be they street criminals trying to steal our phones and laptops, computer criminals trying to defraud us, spyware companies trying to get the most valuable trade secrets of our businesses, repressive governments are trying to stifle dissent or foreign intelligence agencies trying to undermine our most sensitive secrets and national security of our allies.
Encryption protects us against criminal threats and countless national security. This protection would be compromised by the mandatory inclusion of all new vulnerabilities in devices and encrypted services. What you call "door" or "backdoors", the introduction of intentional vulnerabilities in safe products for government use will make these less safe products against other attackers. All experts in computer security who spoke publicly on this issue agrees on this point, including clean government experts.
In addition to undermining cybersecurity, any kind of vulnerability mandate would also seriously damage our economic security. US companies are already struggling to maintain international confidence in the wake of revelations about the National Security Agency surveillance programs. Introducing mandatory vulnerabilities in US products would also push many customers-be they national or international, institutional or individual to turn away from these products and services compromise. Instead, they-and many bad actors whose behavior the government hopes to impact you simply rely on encrypted offers from foreign suppliers, or take advantage of the wide range of free encryption products and open source are easily available online.
More undermine cybersecurity of all US and economic security of the nation, the introduction of new vulnerabilities to weaken encrypted products to the United States would also undermine human rights and the information security worldwide. If US companies maintain the ability to unlock the data and the products of their clients on request, governments other than the United States require the same access, and will also be emboldened to demand the same of their capacity Aboriginal businesses. The US government, having made the same requests, will have little room for the object. The result will be an information environment riddled with vulnerabilities that could be exploited by even the most repressive and dangerous regimes. This is not a future that the American people or the peoples of the world deserve
The administration faces a critical choice :. Should there be policies that promote a global digital ecosystem that is safer, or less? This choice could well define the future of the Internet in the 21st century. When faced with a similar choice at the end of the last century, during the so-called "Crypto Wars", US policymakers have weighed many of the same concerns and arguments raised in the current debate, and correctly concluded that serious costs undermine the encryption technology outweigh the supposed benefits. So also the President on Intelligence Review Group and Communications Technologies, which has unanimously recommended in their report in December 2013, the US government must "(1) full support and not undermine efforts to create encryption standards; (2) in any way subvert, undermine, weaken or make commercial software generally available vulnerable; and (3) increase the use of encryption and encourage US companies to do to better protect data transit, at rest, in the cloud, and other storage. "
We urge the Administration to follow the recommendation of the review Group and to adopt policies that support rather than undermine the widespread adoption of strong encryption technologies, and by doing so help to pave the way for a safer future, prosperous and respectful of the rights for America and for the world.
Thank you,
civil society
- access
- Plea for Principled action within the government
- American-Arab Anti-discrimination Committee (ADC)
- American civil Liberties Union
- American Library Association
- Benetech
- Bill of Rights Defense Committee
- Center for democracy & Technology
- Committee to Protect Journalists
- the draft Constitution
- Alliance Constitution
- Council on American-Islamic Relations
- Demand Progress
- Defending Dissent Foundation
- DownsizeDC.org, Inc.
- electronic Frontier Foundation
- electronic Privacy information Center ( EPIC)
- engine
- Fight for the Future
- Free Press
- Free Software Foundation
- freedom of the Press Foundation
- GNOME Foundation
- The media Consortium
- Institute Open Technology of New America
- Niskanen Center
- Open Source Initiative
- / Foundation for media freedom project Censored
- R Street
- reporters Committee for freedom of the Press
- TechFreedom
- project Tor
- US Board of public policy of the Association for Computing Machinery
- World Privacy Forum
- X-Lab
Business & Trade associations
- ACT | The App Association
- Adobe
- Apple Inc.
- Application Developers Alliance
- Automattic
- Blockstream
- Cisco Systems
- Coinbase
- Cloud Linux Inc.
- CloudFlare
- Computer & Communications Industry Association
- Consumer Electronics Association (CEA)
- relevant context
- The Copia Institute
- Mobile CREDO
- data Foundry
- Dropbox
- Evernote
- Gandi.net
- Golden Frog
- HackerOne
- Hackers / Founders
- Hewlett Packard Company
- Internet Archive
- The Internet Association
- Internet Infrastructure Coalition (i2Coalition)
- Level 3 Communications
- Microsoft
- Misk.com
- Mozilla
- Open Spectrum Inc.
- Rackspace
- Rapid7
- reform government surveillance
- Sonic
- ServInt
- Silent Circle
- Slack Technologies, Inc.
- Symantec
- Tech assets Inc.
- TechNet
- Tumblr
- Wikimedia Foundation
- Yahoo
security and policy experts *
- Hal Abelson, professor of computer science and engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
- Ben Adida, VP engineering, Inc Clever .
- Jacob Appelbaum, the Tor project
- Adam Back, PhD, Inventor, HashCash, co-founder and president, Blockstream
- Alvaro Bedoya, Executive Director, Centre for privacy and technology at Georgetown Law
- Brian Behlendorf, Open Source software pioneers
- Steven M. Bellovin, Percy K. and Vida LW Hudson Professor of Computer Science, Columbia University
- Matt Bishop, professor of computer science, University of California, Davis
- Matthew Blaze, Director, distributed Systems Laboratory, University of Pennsylvania
- Dan Boneh, professor of computer science and of electrical engineering at Stanford University
- Eric Burger, informatics research Professor and Director, security and Software engineering research Center (Georgetown), Georgetown University
- Jon Callas, CTO, Silent Circle
- L. Jean Camp, Professor of computer Science, University of Indiana
- Richard A. Clarke, Chairman, Good Harbor Security Risk Management
- Gabriella Coleman, President Wolfe in scientific and technological culture, McGill University
- Whitfield Diffie, Dr. sc. techn., Center for Security and International Cooperation, Stanford University
- David Evans, Professor of Computer Science, University of Virginia
- David J. Farber, Alfred Filter Moore Professor Emeritus telecommunications, University of Pennsylvania
- Dan Farmer, Security Consultant and researcher, Fishes Vicious Consulting
- Rik Farrow, Internet Security
- Joan Feigenbaum, director of the department and Grace Murray Hopper Professor IT Yale University
- Richard Forno, Jr. Affiliate Scholar, Stanford law school Center for Internet and society
- Alex Fowler, co-founder and vice- President, Blockstream
- Jim Fruchterman, founder and CEO, Benetech
- Daniel Kahn Gillmor, ACLU technologist staff
- Robert Graham, creator of BlackICE, sidejacking and masscan
- Stisa Jennifer Granick, director of civil liberties, Stanford Center Internet and society
- Matthew D. Green, Associate research Professor, Institute of Johns Hopkins University information Security
- Robert Hansen, VP Labs WhiteHat security
- Lance Hoffman, Director, George Washington University, Cyber security policy and research Institute
- Marcia Hofmann, Law office of Marcia Hofmann
- Nadim Kobeissi, PhD Researcher, INRIA
- Joseph Lorenzo hall, Chief technologist, Center for Democracy & Technology
- Nadia Heninger, Assistant Professor, Department of computer science and information, University of Pennsylvania
- David S. Isenberg, Producer, Freedom 2 Connect
- Douglas W. Jones, Department of Computer science, University of Iowa
- Susan Landau, Worcester Polytechnic Institute
- Gordon Fyodor Lyon, Founder, Project Security Scanner Nmap
- Aaron Massey, postdoctoral Fellow, School of interactive Computing, Georgia Institute of Technology
- Jonathan Mayer, Graduate Fellow, Stanford University
- Jeff Moss, founder, security conference DEF CON and Black Hat
- Peter G. Neumann, Senior principal researcher, SRI International Computer science Lab, moderator ACM Risks Forum
- Ken Pfeil, former CISO at Pioneer Investments
- Ronald L. Rivest, Vannevar Bush Professor, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
- Paul Rosenzweig, Professor Professorial right, George University School of law in Washington
- Jeffrey I. Schiller, regional director for security, Internet Engineering Task Force (1994-03), Massachusetts Institute of Technology
- Bruce Schneier, Fellow, Berkman Center for Internet and Society, Harvard Law School
- Micah Sherr, assistant professor of computer science, University of Georgetown
- Adam Shostack, author, "Threat Modeling: Designing security"
- Eugene H. Spafford, Executive Director CERIAS, Purdue University
- Alex Stamos, CISO, Yahoo
- Geoffrey R. Stone, Edward H. Levi distinguished Service Professor of law University of Chicago
- Peter Swire, Professor Huang of the law and ethics, Scheller College of Business, Georgia Institute of Technology
- C. Thomas (Space Rogue) security strategist , Tenable Network Security
- Dan S. Wallach, Professor, Department of computer science and Rice Scholar, Baker Institute of Public Policy
- Nicholas Weaver, a researcher, International Institute of computer science
- Chris Wysopal, co-founder and CTO, Veracode, Inc.
- Phil Zimmermann, chief scientist and co-founder, Silent Circle
* Affiliations provided only for purposes of identification.
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